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ABSTRACT
At present the basic intellectual aim of academic inquiry is to improve knowledge.
Much of the structure, the whole character, of academic inquiry, in universities all over
the world, is shaped by the adoption of this as the basic intellectual aim. But, judged
from the standpoint of making a contribution to human welfare, academic inquiry of
this type is damagingly irrational. Three of four of the most elementary rules of rational
problem-solving are violated. A revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry
is needed so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom, conceived of as the capac-
ity to realize what is of value, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and
technological know-how, but much else besides. This urgently needed revolution would
affect every branch and aspect of the academic enterprise.
Key words: knowledge; wisdom; the Enlightenment; reason; natural science; social
inquiry; philosophy; academic inquiry; intellectual revolution; cooperation.
1. GLOBALPROBLEMS
The world today is beset with problems. There is the impending problem of
global warming. There is the problem of the progressive destruction of tropical
rain forests and other natural habitats, with its concomitant devastating extinc-
tion of species. Humanity urgently needs to discover how to create a sustainable
world industry and agriculture that does not wreak havoc on the environment;
attempts do this have, so far, proved ineffective. There is the terrible problem of
war, over one hundred million people having been killed in countless wars dur-
ing the course of the twentieth century (which compares unfavourably with the
twelve million or so killed in wars during the nineteenth century). There is the
obscenity of the arms trade, the massive stockpiling of armaments, even by poor
countries, and the ever present threat of their use by terrorists or in war, whether30 Nicholas Maxwell
the arms be conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear. There is the sus-
tained, profound injustice of immense discrepancies of wealth across the globe,
the industrially advanced first world of North America, Europe, and elsewhere
experiencing unprecedented wealth while something like three quarters of hu-
manity live in conditions of abject poverty in the third world, hungry, unem-
ployed, without proper housing, health care, education, or even access to safe
water. There is the long-standing problem of the rapid growth of the world’s
population, pronounced especially in the poorest parts of the world, and ad-
versely affecting efforts at development. And there is the horror of the AIDS
epidemic, again far more terrible in the poorest parts of the world, devastating
millions of lives, destroying families, and crippling economies.
And, in addition to these stark global crises, there are problems of a more
diffuse, intangible character, signs of a general cultural or spiritual malaise.
There is the phenomenon of political apathy: the problems of humanity seem so
immense, so remorseless, so utterly beyond human control, and each one of us,
a mere individual, seems wholly impotent before the juggernaut of history. The
new global economy can seem like a monster out of control, we human beings
having to adapt our lives to its demands, rather than it being for us. There is the
phenomenon of the trivialization of culture, as a result of technological innova-
tion, such as TV and the internet. Once people created and participated in their
own live music, theatre, art, and poetry. Now this is pumped into our homes and
into our ears by our technology, a mass-produced culture for mass consumption;
we have become passive consumers, and the product becomes ever more trivial
in content. And finally, there is the phenomenon of the rise of religious and po-
litical fanaticism opposed, it can seem, in all-too faint-hearted and self-doubting
a way by those who seek to uphold democracy and liberalism, apparently con-
firming Yeats’s lines “The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of
passionate intensity”.
2. FROM KNOWLEDGE TO WISDOM
What can be done in response to global problems such as these? There are a
multitude of things that can be done, and a multitude that are being done, in
varying degrees, with varying amounts of success. Here, I wish to concentrate
on just one thing that could be done, which would go to the heart of the above
global problems, and to the heart of our apparent current incapacity to respond
adequately to these problems.
We need to bring about a wholesale, structural revolution in the aims and
methods, the entire intellectual and institutional character of academic inquiry.
At present, academic inquiry is devoted to acquiring knowledge. The idea is to
acquire knowledge, and then apply it to help solve social problems. This needs
to change, so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom—wisdom being
understood to be the capacity to realize what is of value in life for oneself andA Revolution for Science and the Humanities: From Knowledge to Wisdom 31
others (and thus including knowledge, know-how, and understanding).
1 Instead
of devoting itself primarily to solving problems of knowledge, academic inquiry
needs to give intellectual priority to the task of discovering possible solutions to
problems of living. The social sciences need to become social philosophy, or
social methodology, devoted to promoting more cooperatively rational solving
of conflicts and problems of living in the world. Social inquiry, so pursued,
would be intellectually more fundamental than natural science. The natural sci-
ences need to recognize three domains of discussion: evidence, theories, and
aims. Problems concerning research aims need to be discussed by both scien-
tists and non-scientists alike, involving as they do questions concerning social
priorities and values. Philosophy needs to become the sustained rational explo-
ration of our most fundamental problems of understanding; it also needs to take
up the task of discovering how we may improve our personal, institutional, and
global aims and methods in life, so that what is of value in life may be realized
more successfully. Education needs to change so that problems of living become
more fundamental than problems of knowledge, the basic aim of education be-
ing to learn how to acquire wisdom in life. Academic inquiry as a whole needs
to become somewhat like a people’s civil service, having just sufficient power
to retain its independence and integrity, doing for people, openly, what civil
services are supposed to do, in secret, for governments. These and many other
changes, affecting every branch and aspect of academic inquiry, all result from
replacing the aim to acquire knowledge by the aim to promote wisdom by coop-
eratively rational means.
2
—————————
1 A more detailed characterization of wisdom is given below in section 7.
2. For a presentation of the case that the basic aim of inquiry needs to change in the way indi-
cated, and for a discussion of the implications that such a change would have, developed in much
more detail than is possible in the present essay, see my From Knowledge to Wisdom (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1984). See also Nicholas Maxwell, What’s Wrong with Science? Towards a People’s
Rational Science of Delight and Compassion (Frome: Bran’s Head Books, 1976); “Science, Rea-
son, Knowledge, and Wisdom: A Critique of Specialism”, Inquiry, 23 (1980), pp. 19–81; “From
Knowledge to Wisdom: Guiding Choices in Scientific Research”, Bulletin of Science, Technol-
ogy, and Society, 4 (1984), pp. 316–334; “From Knowledge to Wisdom: The Need for an Intellec-
tual Revolution”, Science, Technology, and Society Newsletter, 21 (1985), pp. 55–63; “The Fate
of the Enlightenment: Reply to Kekes”, Inquiry, 29 (1986), pp. 79–82; “Wanted: A New Way of
Thinking”, New Scientist, 14 (May 1987), p. 63; “How Can We Build a Better World?”, in Ein-
heit der Wissenschaften: Internationales Kolloquium der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin,
25–27 June 1990, ed. J. Mittelstrass (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 388–427; “What Kind
of Inquiry Can Best Help Us Create a Good World?” Science, Technology, and Human Values, 17
(1992), pp. 205–227; “What the Task of Creating Civilization Has to Learn from the Success of
Modern Science: Towards a New Enlightenment”, Reflections on Higher Education, 4 (1992), pp.
47–69; “Can Academic Inquiry Help Humanity Become Civilized?”, Philosophy Today, 13
(1993), pp. 1–3; “Science and the Environment: A New Enlightenment”, Science and Public
Affairs, (Spring 1997), pp. 50–56; “Can Humanity Learn to Become Civilized? The Crisis of
Science without Civilization”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17 (2000), pp. 29–44; “Is Science
Neurotic?”, Metaphilosophy, 33 (2002), pp. 259-299; The Human World in the Physical Universe
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), especially chapter 9; Is Science Neurotic?
(London: Imperial College Press, 2004).32 Nicholas Maxwell
3. THE CRISIS OF SCIENCE WITHOUT WISDOM
It may seem surprising that I should suggest that changing the aims and
methods of academic inquiry would help us tackle the above global problems. It
is, however, of decisive importance to appreciate that all the above global prob-
lems have arisen because of a massive increase in scientific knowledge and
technology without a concomitant increase in global wisdom. Degradation of
the environment due to industrialization and modern agriculture, the horrific
number of people killed in war, the arms trade and the stockpiling of modern
armaments, the immense differences in the wealth of populations across the
globe, rapid population growth: all these have come about, have been made
possible, by the rapid growth of science and technology since the birth of mod-
ern science in the seventeenth century. Modern science and technology are even
implicated in the rapid spread of AIDS in the last few decades. It is possible
that, inAfrica,AIDS has been spread in part by a program of polio vaccinations,
or simply by contaminated needles used in inoculation programs; and globally,
AIDS has spread so rapidly because of travel made possible by modern technol-
ogy. And the more intangible global problems indicated above have also come
about, in part, as a result of the rapid growth of modern science and technology.
That the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and technological know-how
should have these kind of consequences is all but inevitable. Scientific and
technological progress massively increases our power to act: in the absence of
wisdom, this will have beneficial consequences, but will also have harmful
ones, whether intended, as in war, or unforeseen and unintended (initially at
least), as in environmental degradation. As long as we lacked modern science,
lack of wisdom did not matter too much: our power to wreak havoc on the
planet and each other was limited. Now that our power to act has been so mas-
sively enhanced by modern science and technology, global wisdom has become,
not a luxury, but a necessity.
The crisis of our times, in short—the crisis behind all the others—is the cri-
sis of science without wisdom. Having a kind of academic inquiry that is, by
and large, restricted to acquiring knowledge can only serve to intensify this cri-
sis.
3 Changing the nature of science, and of academic inquiry more generally, is
—————————
3 It may be objected that it is not science that is the cause of our global problems but rather the
things that we do, made possible by science and technology. This is obviously correct; it is indeed
the point made in the text. But it is also correct to say that scientific and technological progress is
the cause. The meaning of “cause” is ambiguous. By “the cause” of event E we may mean some-
thing like “the most obvious observable events preceding E that figure in the commonsense ex-
planation for the occurrence of E.” In this sense, human actions (made possible by science) are
the cause of such things as people being killed in war or the destruction of tropical rain forests.
On the other hand, by the “cause” of E we may mean “that prior change in the environment of E
that led to the occurrence of E, and without which E would not have occurred”. If we put the
twentieth century into the context of human history, then it is entirely correct to say that, in this
sense, scientific and technological progress is the cause of distinctively twentieth-century disas-A Revolution for Science and the Humanities: From Knowledge to Wisdom 33
the key intellectual and institutional change that we need to make in order to
come to grips with our global problems—above all, the global problem behind
all the others, the crisis of ever-increasing technological power in the absence of
wisdom. We urgently need a new kind of academic inquiry that gives intellec-
tual priority to promoting the growth of global wisdom.
4. THE DAMAGING IRRATIONALITY OF KNOWLEDGE-INQUIRY
There are those who simply blame scientific rationality for our problems.
Scientific rationality needs to be restrained, it is argued, by intuition and tradi-
tion, by morality or religion, by socialism, or by insights acquired from the arts
or humanities.
4 But this kind of response profoundly misses the point. What we
are suffering from is not too much reason, but not enough. Scientific rationality,
so-called, is actually a species of damaging irrationality masquerading as ra-
tionality. Academic inquiry as it mostly exists at present, devoted to the growth
of knowledge and technological know-how—knowledge-inquiry I shall call
it
5—is actually profoundly irrational when judged from the standpoint of con-
tributing to human welfare. Judged from this all-important standpoint, knowl-
edge-inquiry violates three of the four most elementary, uncontroversial rules of
reason that one can conceive of. And that knowledge-inquiry is grossly irra-
tional in this way has everything to do with its tendency to generate the kind of
global problems considered above. Instead of false simulacra of reason, what
we so urgently need is authentic reason devoted to the growth of wisdom.
What then, it may be asked, do I mean by “reason”? As I use the term here,
rationality appeals to the idea that there are general methods, rules, or strategies
which, if put into practice, give us our best chance, other things being equal, of
solving our problems, realizing our aims. Rationality is an aid to success, but
does not guarantee success, and does not determine what needs to be done.
Four elementary rules of rational problem-solving are:
ters: what has changed, what is new, is scientific knowledge, not human nature. Yet again, from
the standpoint of theoretical physics, “the cause” of E might be interpreted to mean something
like “the physical state of affairs prior to E, throughout a sufficiently large spatial region sur-
rounding the place where E occurs”. In this third sense, the sun continuing to shine is as much a
part of the cause of war and pollution as human action or human science and technology.
4 For literature protesting against the influence of scientific rationality in various contexts and
ways, see for example: I. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1999);
R. D. Laing, The Divided Self (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965); H. Marcuse, One Dimensional
Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); T. Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends (London: Faber and
Faber, 1973); M. Berman, The Reenchantment of the World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1981); B. Schwartz, The Battle for Human Nature (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987); P. Feyera-
bend, (1978) Against Method (London: Verso, 1978); and Farewell to Reason (London: Verso,
1987); B. Appleyard, Understanding the Present: Science and the Soul of Modern Man (London:
Picador, 1992).
5 For a much more detailed exposition of knowledge-inquiry, see my From Knowledge to Wis-
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(1) Articulate and seek to improve the articulation of the basic problem(s) to
be solved.
(2) Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions.
(3) When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved into a number
of preliminary, simpler, analogous, subordinate, more specialized prob-
lems—to be tackled in accordance with rules (1) and (2)—in an attempt
to work gradually toward a solution to the basic problem to be solved.
(4) Interconnect attempts to solve the basic problem and specialized prob-
lems, so that basic problem-solving may guide, and be guided by, spe-
cialized problem-solving.
6
No enterprise that persistently violates rules (1) to (4) can be judged rational.
If academic inquiry is to contribute to the aim of promoting human welfare, the
quality of human life, by intellectual means, in a rational way, in a way that
gives the best chances of success, then (1) to (4) must be built into the whole
institutional/intellectual structure of academic inquiry.
In order to see that current academic inquiry, devoted primarily to the pursuit
of knowledge, does indeed violate three of the above four rules of reason (when
viewed from the standpoint of contributing to human welfare), two preliminary
points need to be noted about the nature of the problems that academic inquiry
ought to be trying to help solve.
First, granted that academic inquiry has, as its fundamental aim, to help
promote human welfare, then the problems that academic inquiry fundamentally
ought to try to help solve are problems of living, problems of action. From the
standpoint of achieving what is of value in life, it is what we do, or refrain from
doing, that ultimately matters. Even where new knowledge and technological
know-how is relevant to the achievement of what is of value—as it is in medi-
cine or agriculture, for example—it is always what this new knowledge or tech-
nological know-how enables us to do that matters. All the global problems dis-
cussed above require, for their resolution, not merely new knowledge, but rather
new policies, new institutions, new ways of living. Scientific knowledge, and
associated technological know-how have, if anything, as we have seen, contrib-
uted to the creation of these problems in the first place. Thus problems of liv-
ing—problems of poverty, ill-health, injustice, and deprivation—are solved by
what we do, or refrain from doing; they are not solved by the mere provision of
some item of knowledge.
7
—————————
6For more details see ibid., chapters 3 and 4.
7 The exception to this, of course, is when one has a problem of living that just is: to acquire
some item of knowledge. A scientist, or other academic, who in his or her professional capacity,
actively seeks to acquire some item of knowledge has, in this professional capacity, a problem of
living that is a problem of knowledge; and the solution to the problem of knowledge, when
grasped by the person, is the solution to the problem of living. But we have many desirable goals
in life besides acquisition of knowledge, such as to be healthy, gainfully employed, to enjoyA Revolution for Science and the Humanities: From Knowledge to Wisdom 35
Second, in order to achieve what is of value in life more successfully than
we do at present, we need to discover how to resolve conflicts and problems of
living in more cooperatively rational ways than we do at present. There is a
spectrum of ways in which conflicts can be resolved, from murder or all-out war
at the violent end of the spectrum, via enslavement, threat of murder or war,
threats of a less extreme kind, manipulation, bargaining, and voting, to coopera-
tive rationality at the other end of the spectrum, those involved seeking, by ra-
tional means, to arrive at that course of action that does the best justice to the
interests of all those involved. A basic task for a kind of academic inquiry that
seeks to help promote human welfare must be to discover how conflict resolu-
tion can be moved away from the violent end of the spectrum toward the coop-
eratively rational end.
Granted all this, and granted that the above four rules of reason are put into
practice then, at the most fundamental level, academic inquiry needs to:
(1) Articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, personal, social and
global problems of living that need to be solved if the quality of human
life is to be enhanced (including those indicated in section 1 above).
(2) Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions—alternative
possible actions, policies, political programs, legislative proposals, ide-
ologies, and philosophies of life.
In addition, of course, academic inquiry must:
(3) Break the basic problems of living up into subordinate, specialized prob-
lems—in particular, specialized problems of knowledge and technology.
(4) Interconnect basic and specialized problem-solving.
Academic inquiry as it mostly exists at present can be regarded as putting (3)
into practice to splendid effect. The intricate maze of specialized disciplines
devoted to improving knowledge and technological know-how that go to make
up current academic inquiry are the result. But, disastrously, what we have at
present, a kind of academic inquiry devoted to improving knowledge, fails to
put (1), (2), and (4) into practice. In pursuing knowledge, academic inquiry may
articulate problems of knowledge, and propose and critically assess possible
solutions, possible claims to knowledge—factual theses, observational and ex-
perimental results, and theories. But, as we have seen, problems of knowledge
are not (in general) problems of living; and solutions to problems of knowledge
are not (in general) solutions to problems of living.
In short, academic inquiry devoted to the pursuit of knowledge, when con-
strued as having the basic humanitarian aim of helping to enhance the quality of
human life by intellectual means, fails to put the two most elementary rules of
friendship and love, to care for one’s children, or to create things of value. All such life-aims,
when frustrated, generate problems of living that are not necessarily also problems of knowledge.36 Nicholas Maxwell
reason into practice. Academic inquiry fails to do what it most needs to do,
namely, (1) articulate problems of living, and (2) propose and critically assess
possible solutions. And furthermore, as a result of failing to explore the basic
problems that need to be solved, academic inquiry cannot put the fourth rule of
rational problem-solving into practice either, namely, (4) interconnect basic and
specialized problem-solving. As I have remarked, three of the four most ele-
mentary rules of rational problem-solving are violated.
This gross irrationality of contemporary academic inquiry, of knowledge-
inquiry, is no mere formal matter. It has profoundly damaging consequences for
humanity. As I have pointed out above, granted that our aim is to contribute to
human welfare by intellectual means, the basic problems we need to discover
how to solve are problems of living, problems of action, not problems of
knowledge. In failing to give intellectual priority to problems of living, knowl-
edge-inquiry fails to tackle what most needs to be tackled in order to contribute
to human welfare. In devoting itself to acquiring knowledge in a way that is
unrelated to sustained concern about what humanity’s most urgent problems are,
as a result of failing to put (1) and (2) into practice, and thus failing to put (4)
into practice as well, the danger is that scientific and technological research will
respond to the interests of the powerful and the wealthy, rather than to the inter-
ests of the poor, of those most in need. Priorities of scientific research, globally,
do indeed reflect the interests of the first world, rather than those of the third
world. Knowledge and technology successful pursued in a way that is not ra-
tionally subordinated to the tackling of more fundamental problems of living,
through the failure to put (1), (2), and (4) into practice, is bound to lead to the
kind of global problems discussed above, problems that arise as a result of new
powers to act being divorced from the ability to act wisely. The creation of our
current global problems, and our inability to respond adequately to these prob-
lems, has much to do, in other words, with the long-standing, rarely noticed,
structural irrationality of our institutions and traditions of learning, devoted as
they are to acquiring knowledge dissociated from learning how to tackle our
problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways. Knowledge-inquiry,
because of its irrationality, is designed to intensify, not help solve, our current
global problems.
To sum up: we need to learn how to tackle our problems of living in wiser
ways than we do at present; for this we require institutions and traditions of
learning that put (1) and (2) into practice, thus satisfying elementary require-
ments for rationality; but this we do not have at present, because academic in-
quiry at present fails to put (1) and (2) into practice, and instead devotes itself to
the pursuit of knowledge irrationally dissociated from a more fundamental con-
cern with problems of living. We urgently need academia to create a tradition of
imaginative and critical exploration of our problems of living and what we
might do about them, unconstrained by government, commerce, religiousA Revolution for Science and the Humanities: From Knowledge to Wisdom 37
dogma, or public opinion. We cannot expect this to be done by politicians, civil
servants, journalists, or religious leaders.
At this point, it may be objected that academia does discuss problems of liv-
ing. This goes on in the less theoretical, more practical parts of the social sci-
ences, such as psychiatry, social administration, and economics, and in such
disciplines as medicine, human geography, development studies, engineering,
politics, international affairs, environmental studies, peace and war studies, and
even philosophy.
To begin with, nothing that I say here is intended to decry the work of those
academics who do tackle problems of living, and do put (1) and (2) into prac-
tice. Everything I say here is intended to support such work. My claim is, how-
ever, that such work is at odds with, and must fight against, current intellectual
standards and priorities, stemming as they do from the basic edicts of knowl-
edge-inquiry. What we need is intellectual standards that encourage, instead of
opposing, such work.
It needs to be noted, first, that in so far as there is academic discussion of
problems of living, this goes on very much at the periphery of the academic
enterprise.
8 It is hardly engaged in as the fundamental intellectual activity of
academic inquiry as a whole, influencing research in other areas in accordance
with rule (4).
And there is a good reason for this marginalization of discussion of problems
of living. Such discussion is at odds with the basic edicts of knowledge-inquiry.
What our problems of living are, and what we need to do in order to resolve
them, is never merely a factual issue, a matter about which we can have factual
knowledge. A problem of living arises, roughly, when a person, or a group of
people, fails to attain some legitimate, achievable, desirable, or desired aim. It is
clear, at once, that values are involved, quite essentially: what is “legitimate”
and “desirable” involves questions of value, and moral and legal questions. This
is equally true of any proposed solution to a problem of living, a proposed ac-
tion, policy, plan, political philosophy, or piece of legislation. In putting such a
thing forward as a proposed solution to a problem of living, value-judgments, of
one kind or another, will invariably be involved. A kind of inquiry that restricts
itself to the pursuit of factual knowledge excludes values from the intellectual
domain of inquiry, and must, therefore, exclude representations of problems of
living, and proposals for their resolution. At most, inquiry of this type can ac-
quire factual knowledge about problems of living and how they are to be solved
given some set of values—a political philosophy, a philosophy of life, being
assumed. Or, knowledge can be developed about what people in fact hold to be
problems of living, and what should be done about them. But these are not ade-
quate substitutes for the tasks of (1) articulating problems of living, and (2)
—————————
8 For a survey of academic work, from science to the humanities, that bears out this point, see
my From Knowledge to Wisdom, chapter 6.38 Nicholas Maxwell
proposing and critically assessing possible solutions, without restrictions. Aca-
demics cannot put forward ideas as to how our problems of living might be
solved within the framework of knowledge-inquiry, because such ideas are pro-
posals for action, not claims to knowledge; they involve an admixture of values
and facts, ideals and methods, and none of this is acceptable or rational, accord-
ing to the intellectual standards of knowledge-inquiry. Knowledge-inquiry de-
mands of acceptable academic contributions that they be potential contributions
to factual knowledge. Current scientific standards demand, even more restric-
tively, that potential contributions to science be empirically testable. Possible
solutions to problems of living simply do not qualify, however practical, effec-
tive, desirable, intelligent, and wise they may be.
Recently, I had a look at thirty-four introductory textbooks on sociology,
chosen at random, published between 1985 and 1997, to see how the subject is
defined. If tackling problems of living intellectually is basic, and not peripheral,
to academic inquiry as a whole, then certainly this will be basic to sociology,
and will register in introductory texts on the subject. I found that sociology is
defined in such terms as “the scientific study of human society and social inter-
actions”, “the systematic, sceptical study of human society”, or as having as its
basic aim “to understand human societies and the forces that have made them
what they are”.
9 Some books take issue with the idea that sociology is the scien-
tific study of society, or protest at the male-dominated nature of sociology.
10
Nowhere was there a whisper of the idea that sociology might have, as a basic
aim, to help people solve social problems of living.
5. PROBLEM-SOLVINGWISDOM-INQUIRY
Inquiry devoted primarily to the pursuit of knowledge is, then, grossly and
damagingly irrational when judged from the standpoint of contributing to hu-
man welfare by intellectual means. At once the question arises: What would a
kind of inquiry be like that is devoted, in a genuinely rational way, to promoting
human welfare by intellectual means? I shall call such a hypothetical kind of
inquiry wisdom-inquiry, to stand in contrast to knowledge-inquiry.
As a first step at characterizing wisdom-inquiry, we may take knowledge-
inquiry (at its best) and modify it just sufficiently to ensure that all four elemen-
tary rules of rational problem-solving are built into its intellectual and institu-
tional structure. The result has already been sketched in section 2 above, and
will be indicated in greater detail below, in sections 7 and 8. Here, very briefly,
—————————
9 These quotations come, respectively, from H. Tischler, Introduction to Sociology (Orlando:
Harcourt Brace, 1994), p. 4; J. Macionis and K. Plummer, Sociology: A Global Introduction (New
York: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 4; G. Lenski et al., Human Societies: An Introduction to Macroso-
ciology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), p. 5.
10 See, for example, P. Abott and C. Wallace, An Introduction to Sociology: Feminist Perspec-
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to keep repetition to a minimum, is an indication of some structural changes that
need to be made to knowledge-inquiry to ensure that (1) to (4) are all imple-
mented.
The primary change that needs to be made is to ensure that academic inquiry
implements (1) and (2). It becomes the fundamental task of social inquiry (1) to
articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, our problems of living, and
(2) to propose and critically assess possible solutions, from the standpoint of
their practicality and desirability. In particular, social inquiry has the task of
discovering how conflicts may be resolved in less violent, more cooperatively
rational ways. It also has the task of promoting such increasingly cooperatively
rational tackling of problems of living in the social world beyond academe.
Social inquiry is, thus, not primarily social science, nor, primarily, concerned to
acquire knowledge of the social world; its primary task is to promote more co-
operatively rational tackling of problems of living in the social world. Pursued
in this way, social inquiry is intellectually more fundamental than the natural
and technological sciences, which tackle subordinate problems of knowledge,
understanding, and technology, in accordance with rule (3). Indeed, the thinking
that we engage in as we live, in seeking to realize what is of value to us, is intel-
lectually more fundamental than the whole of academic inquiry (which has, as
its basic purpose, to help cooperatively rational thinking and problem-solving in
life to flourish). Academic thought emerges as a kind of specialization of per-
sonal and social thinking in life, the result of implementing rule (3); this means
there needs to be a two-way interplay of ideas, arguments and experiences be-
tween the social world and academia, in accordance with rule (4).
The natural and technological sciences need to recognize three domains of
discussion: evidence, theory, and aims. The latter seeks to identify that highly
problematic region of overlap between that which is discoverable, and that
which it is of value to discover. Discussion of what it is of value to discover
interacts with social inquiry, in accordance with rule (4).
As I remarked above, in section 2, academic inquiry needs to become some-
what like a people’s civil service, having just sufficient power to retain its inde-
pendence and integrity, doing for people, openly, what civil services are sup-
posed to do, in secret, for governments. The overall aim of inquiry becomes to
promote personal, social, and global wisdom.
Among the many questions that may be asked about the argument so far,
there are three that I shall try to answer in what follows. First, can academic
inquiry, as it exists at present, really be as radically and damagingly irrational as
I have argued it is? How and when did this irrationality become established?
Second, is problem-solving wisdom-inquiry, as just sketched, really an im-
provement over knowledge-inquiry? This kind of inquiry seeks solutions to
problems of living that contribute to human welfare. But whose welfare, what
kind of welfare, and who decides? How are crucial questions about what is of
value, inherent in the aims of inquiry, to be decided? And third, what role does40 Nicholas Maxwell
wisdom-inquiry give to science and scholarship pursued for their own sake, and
not in order to solve practical problems of living? In what follows I take these
questions in turn.
6. THE TRADITIONAL ENLIGHTENMENT
The irrationality of contemporary academic inquiry has its roots in blunders
made by the philosophes of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.
A basic idea of the Enlightenment, perhaps the basic idea, was to try to learn
from scientific progress how to go about making social progress toward an
enlightened world. The philosophes, Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet, and others,
did what they could to put this immensely important idea into practice in their
lives. They fought dictatorial power, superstition, and injustice with weapons no
more lethal than those of argument and wit. They gave their support to the vir-
tues of tolerance, openness to doubt, readiness to learn from criticism and from
experience. Courageously and energetically they labored to promote rationality
in personal and social life.
11
Unfortunately, in developing the Enlightenment idea intellectually, the phi-
losophes blundered. They thought the task was to develop the social sciences
alongside the natural sciences. I shall call this the traditional Enlightenment
Program. It was developed throughout the nineteenth century, by Comte, Marx,
Mill, and others, and built into the institutional structure of universities during
the twentieth century, with the creation of departments of anthropology, eco-
nomics, sociology, psychology, and political science.
12 Knowledge-inquiry, as
we have it today, by and large, is the result. But, from the standpoint of creating
a kind of inquiry designed to help humanity learn how to become civilized, all
this amounts to a series of monumental blunders.
In order to implement properly the basic Enlightenment idea of learning
from scientific progress to how to achieve social progress toward a civilized
world, it is essential to get the following three steps right.
1. The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identi-
fied.
—————————
11 The best overall account of the Enlightenment that I know of is still: P. Gay, The Enlighten-
ment: An Interpretation (London: Wildwood House, 1973).
12 See, for example: R. Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, 2 vols. (London: Pen-
guin, 1968–1970); J. Farganis, ed., Readings in Social Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-
Modernism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); F. A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science:
Studies on the Abuse of Reason (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979); R. Heilbroner, The Worldly
Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers (New York: Simon
and Shuster, 1980); A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writ-
ings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1971); G. Duncan, Marx and Mill (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978).A Revolution for Science and the Humanities: From Knowledge to Wisdom 41
2. These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruit-
fully applicable to any human endeavor, whatever the aims may be, and
not just applicable to the endeavor of improving knowledge.
3. The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be
exploited correctly in the great human endeavor of trying to make social
progress toward an enlightened, wise, civilized world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three steps disas-
trously wrong. They failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods
of natural science; they failed to generalize these methods properly; and, most
disastrously of all, they failed to apply them properly so that humanity might
learn how to become civilized by rational means. That the philosophes made
these blunders in the eighteenth century is forgivable; what is unforgivable is
that these blunders still remain unrecognized and uncorrected today, over two
centuries later.
The Enlightenment, and what it led to, has long been criticized, by the Ro-
mantic movement, by what Isaiah Berlin has called “the counter-
Enlightenment”,
13 and more recently by the Frankfurt school, by postmodern-
ists, and others.
14 The criticism of the traditional Enlightenment of this essay is
different. In particular, it is the very opposite of all those anti-rationalist, roman-
tic, and postmodernist criticisms which object to the way the Enlightenment
gives far too great an importance to natural science and to scientific rationality.
According to the argument of this essay, what is wrong with the traditional
Enlightenment, and the kind of academic inquiry we now possess derived from
it, is not too much “scientific rationality” but, on the contrary, not enough. As
we have already seen, it is the glaring, wholesale irrationality of contemporary
academic inquiry, when judged from the standpoint of helping humanity learn
how to become more civilized, that is the problem.
The view I argue for is far from being a victory of traditional rationalism
over romanticism. If anything, it is a synthesis of the two. It includes elements
from both, and it improves on both. It incorporates romantic ideals of integrity,
having to do with motivational and emotional honesty, honesty about desires
and aims; and at the same time it incorporates traditional rationalist ideals of
integrity, having to do with respect for objective fact, knowledge, and valid
—————————
13 I. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism; and Against the Current (London: Hogarth Press,
1980), pp. 1–24.
14 For a clearly written, sympathetic, but critical discussion of criticisms of the Enlightenment,
from Horkheimer and Adorno, via Lyotard, Foucault, Habermas, and Derrida to MacIntyre and
Rorty, see A. Gascardi, Consequences of Enlightenment (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999). For less sympathetic criticisms of postmodernists’ anti-rationalism, see: A.
Sokal and J. Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures (London: Profile Books, 1998); P. Gross, et al.,
eds., The Flight from Science and Reason (New York: Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1996); N. Koertge, ed., A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about
Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).42 Nicholas Maxwell
argument. Traditional rationalism takes its inspiration from science and method;
romanticism takes its inspiration from art, from imagination, and from passion.
The view I argue for holds art to have a fundamental rational role in inquiry, in
revealing what is of value, and unmasking false values; but science, too, is of
fundamental importance. In order to discover what is of value, we need to at-
tend to our desires, our emotional responses; but not everything we desire is
desirable, and not everything that feels good is good. What we need, for wis-
dom, is an interplay of skeptical rationality and emotion, an interplay of mind
and heart, so that we may develop mindful hearts and heartfelt minds. It is time
we healed the great rift in our culture, so graphically depicted by C. P. Snow.
15
7. THE NEW ENLIGHTENMENT
What, then, in a little more detail, are the three great blunders of the tradi-
tional Enlightenment, still built into the intellectual/institutional structure of
academic inquiry today, and what needs to be done to put them right? Let us
take the three blunders in turn.
The first blunder concerns the nature of the progress-achieving methods of
science. Scientists and philosophers of science today make the assumption, in-
herited from the Enlightenment,
16 that science makes progress because, in sci-
ence, theories are assessed impartially on the basis of evidence alone, no per-
manent assumption being made about the nature of the universe independent of
evidence. Choice of theory in science may be influenced by such considerations
as the relative simplicity, unity, or explanatory power of the theories in question,
in addition to empirical considerations; this is permissible, as long as it does not
involve assuming, permanently, that nature herself is simple, unified or compre-
hensible.
17
—————————
15 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures: And a Second Look (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1986).
16 The philosophes of the Enlightenment tended to assume that the triumph of Newtonian sci-
ence over Cartesian science meant also the triumph of Newtonian inductivist methodology over
Cartesian rationalism. They tended to espouse the extreme empiricism of Bacon and Locke, re-
jecting the rationalism of Descartes. But there are exceptions, such as Kant. And d’Alembert
hardly fits into the extreme empiricist view when he asserts: “The universe, if we may be permit-
ted to say so, would only be one fact and one great truth for whoever knew how to embrace it
from a single point of view” (J. D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of
Diderot [New York: Bobbs-Merrill, {1751} 1963], p. 29.
17 Karl Popper formulates this widely held view like this: “. . . in science, only observation and
experiment may decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, including laws
and theories”; K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1963), p. 54. For an indication of just how widely held standard empiricism is, see my The Com-
prehensibility of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 38–45.A Revolution for Science and the Humanities: From Knowledge to Wisdom 43
But this orthodox standard empiricist assumption about the nature of the
progress-achieving methods of science is untenable.
18 Given any scientific the-
ory, however well verified empirically, there will always be infinitely many
rival theories, equally well supported by the evidence, which make different
predictions, in an arbitrary way, for phenomena not yet observed. One can set
out to refute these rival theories by making the relevant observations or experi-
ments, but as there are infinitely many of them, this may take some time. In
short, if science really did take seriously the idea that theories must be selected
on the basis of evidence alone, science would be swamped by an infinity of
empirically equally successful rival theories; science would come to an end.
19
This does not happen in scientific practice because, in practice, given an ac-
cepted, well verified theory, such as Newtonian theory, quantum theory, or gen-
eral relativity, almost all the infinitely many equally empirically successful rival
theories are, in comparison, grotesquely ad hoc and disunified. They postulate,
arbitrarily, that, for example, at some time in the future Newton’s inverse square
law of gravitation becomes an inverse cube law. Such theories are, in practice,
excluded from scientific consideration on the grounds that they lack simplicity,
unity, or explanatory power.
Now comes the crucial point. In persistently excluding infinitely many such
empirically successful but grotesquely ad hoc theories, science in effect makes a
big assumption about the nature of the universe, to the effect that it is such that
no grotesquely ad hoc theory is true, however empirically successful it may
appear to be for a time. Without some such big assumption as this, the empirical
method of science collapses. Science is drowned in an infinite ocean of empiri-
cally successful ad hoc theories.
20
At once the question arises: Granted that science must make some kind of
big assumption about the nature of the universe if it is to be possible at all, what
precisely ought this assumption to be, and on what basis is it to be made? We
must make some assumption about the ultimate nature of the universe before
science can proceed at all; if science is to proceed successfully, we must make
—————————
18 It is worth noting that Newton upheld a conception of natural philosophy (natural science)
that is, in important respects, more sophisticated than standard empiricism, presupposed by so
many twentieth-century scientists and philosophers of science. Newton formulates three of his
four rules of reasoning in such a way that it is clear that these rules make assumptions about the
nature of the universe. Thus rule 1 asserts: “We are to admit no more causes of natural things
than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.” And Newton adds: “To
this purpose the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less
will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.”
See I. Newton, Principia, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 398. Newton
seems to have understood that persistently preferring simple theories means that nature herself is
being persistently assumed to be simple (which violates standard empiricism).
19 See my The Comprehensibility of the Universe, pp. 45–56.
20For a much more detailed exposition and refutation of standard empiricism see ibid., chapters
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an assumption that is near enough correct: and yet it is just here that we are
horribly ignorant, and are almost bound to get things hopelessly wrong.
The solution to this basic dilemma confronting the scientific endeavor (as
expounded in some detail in my The Comprehensibility of the Universe) can be
put like this: Cosmological speculation about the ultimate nature of the uni-
verse, being necessary for science to be possible at all, must be regarded as a
part of scientific knowledge itself, however epistemologically unsound it may
be in other respects. The best such speculation available is that the universe is
comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, in the light of the
immense apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically com-
prehensible. But both these speculations may be false; in order to take this pos-
sibility into account, we need to adopt a hierarchy of increasingly contentless
cosmological conjectures concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of
the universe until we arrive at the conjecture that the universe is such that it is
possible for us to acquire some knowledge of something, a conjecture so con-
tentless that it could not be rational for us to reject it in any circumstances what-
soever. As a result of adopting such a hierarchy of increasingly contentless cos-
mological conjectures in this way, we maximize our chances of adopting con-
jectures that promote the growth of knowledge, and minimize our chances of
taking some cosmological assumption for granted that is false and impedes the
growth of knowledge.
Schematically, this hierarchical conception of scientific knowledge and
method can be represented as follows, in terms of ten levels.
 Level 10: The universe is partially knowable, in the sense that we can ac-
quire knowledge of our local circumstances sufficient to enable us to con-
tinue to live.
 Level 9: The universe is such that, something exists locally that makes
local knowledge possible, which exists everywhere, thus making it possi-
ble to use local knowledge as a basis for acquiring some knowledge of
what exists elsewhere.
 Level 8: Assumptions built into current methods for improving knowl-
edge can be improved, thus leading to improved methods for improving
knowledge.
 Level 7: The universe is roughly comprehensible, in the sense that it is
such that some assumption of partial comprehensibility is empirically
fruitful.
 Level 6: The universe is nearly comprehensible in that the assumption
that it is perfectly comprehensible is empirically fruitful.
 Level 5: The universe is perfectly comprehensible (in the sense that
something exists everywhere, which does not change but which deter-
mines, perhaps probabilistically, the way everything does change, and in
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 Level 4: The universe is physically comprehensible (the ubiquitous
“something” of level 5 being a physical entity, such as a unified field).
 Level 3: The best available more or less specific metaphysical assump-
tion as to how the universe is physically comprehensible.
 Level 2: Best current fundamental physical theories.
 Level 1: Evidence.
As one goes up this hierarchy, from level 3 to level 10, the corresponding
theses assert less and less; they are more and more likely to be true, and are less
and less likely to need revision as science makes progress. Thus, the level 3
thesis has been revised many times since Galileo: initially the corpuscular hy-
pothesis in the seventeenth century, this became the thesis that the universe is
composed of point-particles interacting by means of a force at a distance in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which in turn became the thesis that there is
a unified field of force in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
which transformed into the view that there is some kind of quantum field in
curved space-time in the mid-twentieth century, now rejected in favor of string
theory. The level 4 thesis was changed dramatically by Galileo, when he re-
jected Aristotelianism and adopted the view instead that “the book of nature is
written in the language of mathematics”; but it has not undergone any such
dramatic change since. Theses higher up in the hierarchy have not been modi-
fied.
Corresponding to each thesis, A, at each level above 2, there is a methodo-
logical rule which asserts: accept that thesis lower down in the hierarchy which
(a) exemplifies, and is a special case of the thesis A, and which (b) is more em-
pirically fruitful, or promises to be more empirically fruitful, than any rival at
that level. Level 2 theories are accepted, which (a) meet with the greatest em-
pirical success and (b) best exemplify the best available thesis at level 3.
The hope is that as we increase our knowledge about the world we improve
(lower level) cosmological theses implicit in our methods, and thus in turn im-
prove our methods. As a result of improving our knowledge, we improve our
knowledge about how to improve knowledge. Science adapts its own nature to
what it learns about the nature of the universe, thus increasing its capacity to
make progress in knowledge about the world.
21
This aim-oriented empiricist methodology, in stark contrast to current ortho-
doxy, is the key to the success of modern science. The basic aim of science of
discovering how, and to what extent, the universe is comprehensible is deeply
problematic; it is essential that we try to improve the aim, and associated meth-
—————————
21 For a much more detailed exposition and defence of aim-oriented empiricism, together with
detailed accounts of what I mean by the thesis that the universe is comprehensible, or physically
comprehensible, see my The Comprehensibility of the Universe, chapters 1 and 3 to 6. For a more
recent summary, see my “Has Science Established that the Universe is Comprehensible?”, Cogito,
13 (1999), pp. 139–145. See also my Is Science Neurotic?, chapters 1 and 2, and appendix.46 Nicholas Maxwell
ods, as we proceed, in the light of apparent success and failure. In order to do
this in the best possible way, we need to represent our aim at a number of levels,
from the specific and problematic to the highly unspecific and unproblematic,
thus creating a framework of fixed aims and meta-methods within which the
(more or less specific) aims and methods of science may be progressively im-
proved in the light of apparent empirical success and failure, as depicted above.
The result is that, as we improve our knowledge about the world, we are able to
improve our knowledge about how to improve knowledge, the methodological
key to the rapid progress of modern science.
Adoption of this aim-oriented empiricist view by the scientific community as
the official, orthodox conception of science would correct the first blunder of
the traditional Enlightenment.
But what of the second blunder? The task, here, is to generalize the progress-
achieving methods of science appropriately so that they become progress-
achieving methods that are, potentially, fruitfully applicable to any problematic
human endeavor. The task, in other words, is to generalize scientific rationality
so that it becomes rationality per se, helping us to achieve what is of value
whatever we may be doing.
Needless to say, scientists and philosophers, having failed to specify the
methods of science properly, have also failed to arrive at the proper generaliza-
tion of these methods. The best attempt known to me is that made by Karl Pop-
per. According to Popper, science makes progress because it puts into practice
the method of proposing theories as conjectures, which are then subjected to
sustained attempted empirical refutation.
22 Popper argues that this can be gener-
alized to form a conception of rationality, according to which one seeks to solve
problems quite generally by putting forward conjectures as to how a given prob-
lem is to be solved, these conjectures then being subjected to sustained criticism
(criticism being a generalization of attempted empirical refutation in science).
23
Rules (1) and (2) of rational problem-solving of section 4 above encapsulate
Popper’s critical rationalism. The four rules of section 4, taken together, im-
prove on Popper’s notion of rationality. Popper was too hostile to specialization
to appreciate that it might have a rational purpose.
Popper’s ideas about scientific method and how it is to be generalized are an
improvement over eighteenth-century notions, but they are still defective, even
when improved in the way indicated in section 4. Popper’s conception of scien-
tific method is defective because it is a version of standard empiricism, which
—————————
22 See K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations; and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London:
Hutchinson, 1959).
23 “Inter-subjective testing is merely a very important aspect of the more general idea of inter-
subjective criticism, or in other words, of the idea of mutual rational control by critical discus-
sion”, Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 44, n. 1. See also K. Popper, Conjectures and
Refutations, pp. 193–200; Unended Quest (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), pp. 115–116; Objective
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we have already seen is untenable. It fails to identify the problematic aim of
science properly, and thus fails to specify the need for science to improve its
aims and methods as it proceeds. Popper’s notion of critical rationalism is de-
fective in an analogous way. It does not make improving aims and methods,
when aims are problematic, an essential aspect of rationality.
If, however, we take the above aim-oriented empiricist conception of scien-
tific method as our starting point, and generalize that, the outcome is quite dif-
ferent. It is not just in science that aims are problematic; this is the case in life
too, either because different aims conflict, or because what we believe to be
desirable and realizable lacks one or other of these features, or both. Above all,
the aim of creating global civilization, wisdom, or enlightenment is inherently
and profoundly problematic.
24 Quite generally, then, and not just in science,
whenever we pursue a problematic aim, we need to represent the aim as a hier-
archy of aims, from the specific and problematic at the bottom of the hierarchy,
to the general and unproblematic at the top. In this way, we provide ourselves
with a framework within which we may improve more or less specific and prob-
lematic aims and methods as we proceed, learning from success and failure in
practice what it is that is both of most value and realizable. Such an “aim-
oriented” conception of rationality is the proper generalization of the aim-
oriented, progress-achieving methods of science.
25 Aim-oriented rationality
incorporates and improves on problem-solving rationality indicated in section 4
above.
So much for the second blunder, and how it is to be put right. We come now
to the third blunder. This is by far the most serious of the three blunders made
by the traditional Enlightenment. The basic Enlightenment idea, after all, is to
learn from scientific progress how to make social progress toward an enlight-
ened world. Putting this idea into practice involves getting appropriately gener-
alized progress-achieving methods of science into social life itself! It involves
getting progress-achieving methods into our institutions and ways of life, into
government, industry, agriculture, commerce, international relations, the media,
—————————
24 There are a number of ways of highlighting the inherently problematic character of the aim
of creating civilization. People have very different ideas as to what does constitute civilization.
Most views about what constitutes utopia, an ideally enlightened or civilized society, have been
unrealizable and profoundly undesirable. People’s interests, values, and ideals clash. Even values
that, one may hold, ought to be a part of civilization may clash. Thus, freedom and equality, even
though inter-related, may nevertheless clash. It would be an odd notion of individual freedom that
held that freedom was for some, and not for others; and yet if equality is pursued too singlemind-
edly this will undermine individual freedom, and will even undermine equality, in that a privi-
leged class will be required to enforce equality on the rest, as in the old Soviet Union. A basic aim
of legislation for civilization, we may well hold, ought to be to increase freedom by restricting it:
this brings out the inherently problematic, paradoxical character of the aim of achieving civiliza-
tion.
25 For a much more detailed exposition of aim-oriented rationality, see my From Knowledge to
Wisdom, especially chapters 5 and 8. See also my Is Science Neurotic?, chapters 3 and 4.48 Nicholas Maxwell
the arts, and education. But in sharp contrast to all this, the traditional Enlight-
enment has sought to apply generalized scientific method, not to social life, but
merely to social science! Instead of helping humanity learn how to create a
wiser, more enlightened, civilized world by increasingly cooperatively rational
means, the traditional Enlightenment has sought merely to help social scientists
improve knowledge of social phenomena. The outcome is that today academic
inquiry devotes itself to acquiring knowledge of natural and social phenomena,
but does not attempt to help humanity learn how to make progress toward a
wise world. This is the key blunder which, built into the intellectual/institutional
structure of academic inquiry today, produces a kind of inquiry brilliant at ac-
quiring knowledge, but hopeless and damagingly irrational when it comes to
promoting global wisdom. This is the blunder that leads to a kind of inquiry that
violates the three elementary rules of rational problem-solving indicated in sec-
tion 4.
It is this third, monumental and disastrous blunder that requires, for its cor-
rection, a revolution in the nature of academic inquiry, beginning with social
inquiry and the humanities.
26 Social inquiry is not, as I have already stressed,
primarily social science. Its proper basic task is to help humanity build into
institutions and social life quite generally the progress-achieving methods of
aim-oriented rationality (arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving
methods of science as indicated above). Social inquiry (sociology, economics,
anthropology, and the rest) is thus social methodology or social philosophy. Its
task is to help diverse valuable human endeavors and institutions gradually im-
prove aims and methods so that the world may make social progress toward
global enlightenment. And the primary task of academic inquiry, more gener-
ally, becomes to help humanity solve its problems of living in increasingly ra-
tional, cooperative, enlightened ways, thus helping humanity become more civi-
lized. What the philosophy of science is to science within the framework of
aim-oriented empiricism, namely an integral and influential part of the scientific
endeavor, which seeks to improve the aims and methods of science, so social
inquiry is to the rest of the social world, an integral and influential part of the
humanitarian endeavor to make progress toward a wiser world by improving the
aims and methods of our diverse institutions and social pursuits. On this view,
the sociology of science, in particular, is the philosophy of science.
The basic aim of academic inquiry becomes to promote the growth of wis-
dom. I have already given a brief characterization of what I take wisdom to be,
in section 2 above. In a little more detail, wisdom can be understood to be the
capacity (and perhaps the active desire) to realize what is of value in life, for
oneself and others. Wisdom includes knowledge, technological know-how, and
understanding (so that those parts of inquiry devoted to improving these can
—————————
26 For a more detailed exposition of the nature of the revolution that is required, see my From
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contribute to improving wisdom). But wisdom includes much else besides, such
as the desire and active striving for what is of value, the ability to see what is of
value, actually and potentially, in the circumstances of life, the ability to experi-
ence value, the capacity to help realize what is of value for oneself and others,
the capacity to help solve those problems of living that arise in connection with
attempts to realize what is of value, and the capacity to use and develop knowl-
edge, technology, and understanding as needed for the realization of value. Wis-
dom, like knowledge, can be conceived of, not only in personal terms, but also
in institutional or social terms. In seeking to promote wisdom, academic inquiry
has the task of helping us develop wiser ways of living, wiser institutions, cus-
toms, social relations, and a wiser world. The phrase “to realize what is of
value” is to be interpreted to mean both “to become aware of what is of value”
and “to make real or actual what is of value potentially.” Inquiry devoted to
promoting wisdom, to helping us “realize” what is of value, supports both in-
quiry pursued for its own sake, for the sake, that is, of seeing and searching as
ends in their own right, on the one hand, and inquiry pursued for the sake of
achieving other goals of value, on the other hand. In other words, both so-called
“pure” and “applied” science and scholarship have their place within inquiry
devoted to the pursuit of wisdom.
As I have already stressed, the aim of achieving global wisdom or civiliza-
tion is inherently problematic. This means, according to aim-oriented rational-
ity, that we need to represent the aim at a number of levels, from the specific
and highly problematic to the unspecific and unproblematic. Just as the inher-
ently problematic aim of science needs to be represented at a number of levels,
so that a framework of fixed aims and methods can be created within which
more specific and more problematic aims and methods can be improved with
improving knowledge, so likewise, in connection with the endeavor to create a
wiser, more civilized world, this inherently and profoundly problematic aim
needs to be represented at a number of levels. This needs to be done so that, just
as in science, a framework of fixed, unproblematic aims and methods can be
created within which more specific, problematic aims and methods can be im-
proved in the light of the success and failure of various initiatives—political,
moral, institutional, and cultural.
Here is a cartoon sketch of the kind of thing that we require:
 Level 7: Civilization(5)—That ideal, realizable social order, whatever it
may be, that we ought to try to attain in the long term.
 Level 6: Civilization(4)—A world in which everyone shares equally in
enjoying, sustaining and creating what is of value, in so far as this is pos-
sible.
 Level 5: Civilization(3)—A world that is democratic, liberal, just, sus-
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 Level 4: Civilization(2)—A world with global democracy that puts the
new Enlightenment into practice.
 Level 3: Civilization(1)—Best current specific ideas for world civiliza-
tion.
 Level 2: Policies, projects, new laws, institutions, and political programs.
 Level 1: Human experience (history); what people enjoy and suffer.
As a result of building into our institutions and social life such a hierarchical
structure of aims and associated methods, we create a framework within which
it becomes possible for us progressively to improve our real-life aims and
methods in increasingly cooperative ways as we live. Diverse philosophies of
life—diverse religious, political, economic, and moral views—may be coopera-
tively developed, assessed and tested against the experience of personal and
social life. It becomes possible progressively to improve diverse philosophies of
life (diverse views about what is of value in life and how it is to be realized)
much as theories are progressively and cooperatively improved in science. This
is the methodological key to humanity discovering how gradually to acquire
greater wisdom, by means of experience and cooperative rationality.
We have here, too, the nub of the solution to the problem of how decisions
can be reached about what aims and ideals ought to be pursued, what values
adopted. As a result of representing our aims, ideals, and values in the hierarchi-
cal form of aim-oriented rationality, we create the possibility of learning what
aims we should pursue, what values we should adopt, as we live and act. We
create the possibility of resolving problems and conflicts concerning aims, ide-
als, and values in cooperatively rational ways. As I have already indicated, a
spectrum of methods exists for resolving conflicts, from annihilation of the op-
position at the extreme violent end of the spectrum, to wise cooperative ration-
ality at the opposite end. All that academia can hope to do is to help humanity
gradually move from the violent end of the spectrum toward the more coopera-
tive end, to the extent that this is possible and desirable.
Academia does not decide for the rest of humanity what aims ought to be
pursued, what values upheld; rather it seeks to represent the best aims and val-
ues, at various levels, wherever these may come from, whoever may adopt or
espouse them. Academic thought emerges as a result of dialogue between aca-
demics and non-academics: ideas, arguments and experiences go to and fro in
both directions. In the end, what really matters is the thinking we engage in as
we live, guiding our actions.Academic thought is a kind of specialization of this
living thinking, the outcome of implementing rule (3). It is important, then, that
the thinking, the problem-solving, that we engage in as we live, influences and
is influenced by more specialized academic thought, in accordance with rule
(4). It is vital that it is not necessary to have a Ph.D. before one can contribute to
academic thought, contributions being assessed on their merit, and not on the
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What of the third question raised at the end of section 5, concerning the
place of inquiry pursued for its own sake within wisdom-inquiry?
Not only does wisdom-inquiry stress the vital importance of inquiry pursued
for its own sake; in addition, a part of the case for wisdom-inquiry is that it does
better justice to this aspect of inquiry, in addition to the practical aspects of in-
quiry, than does knowledge-inquiry.
According to wisdom-inquiry, the basic aim of inquiry is to help us realize
what is of value, “realize” meaning both to apprehend, and to make real. Inquiry
pursued for the sake of apprehending what is of value corresponds to what is
often called “pure” research, or inquiry pursued for its own sake. It is theoretical
physics pursued in order to enhance our knowledge and understanding of the
dynamical structure of this mysterious universe we find ourselves in. It is biol-
ogy pursued in order to enhance our knowledge and understanding of the rich
variety of living things on earth, their physical structure, their extraordinary
diversity of design, their ways of life. It is astronomy and cosmology pursued in
order to improve our knowledge and understanding of the universe. It is geol-
ogy pursued in order to increase our knowledge of the earth’s structure, and its
history. It is history pursued in order to improve our knowledge and understand-
ing of past human events, people, ways of living, and so on. Inquiry, viewed
from this perspective, might be regarded as a collection of intellectual specta-
cles, telescopes, and microscopes, manufactured for us to use in order to aid our
exploration of our world.
There are a number of ways in which the philosophy of wisdom does better
justice to this “intellectual” or “cultural” aspect of inquiry than does the phi-
losophy of knowledge. I shall indicate just three.
(1) From the standpoint of the intellectual or cultural aspect of inquiry, what
really matters is the desire that people have to see, to know, and to understand,
the passionate curiosity that individuals have about aspects of the world, and the
knowledge and understanding that people acquire and share as a result of ac-
tively following up their curiosity. An important task for academic thought in
universities is to encourage non-professional thought to flourish outside univer-
sities. As Einstein once remarked “Knowledge exists in two forms—lifeless,
stored in books, and alive in the consciousness of men. The second form of
existence is after all the essential one; the first, indispensable as it may be, oc-
cupies only an inferior position.”
27
Wisdom-inquiry is designed to promote all this in a number of ways. It does
so as a result of holding thought, at its most fundamental, to be the personal
thinking we engage in as we live. It does so by recognizing that acquiring
knowledge and understanding involves articulating and solving personal prob-
lems that one encounters in seeking to know and understand. It does so by rec-
—————————
27 A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (London: Souvenir Press, 1973), p. 80.52 Nicholas Maxwell
ognizing that passion, emotion, and desire, have a rational role to play in in-
quiry, disinterested research being a myth. Again, as Einstein has put it “The
most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It is the fundamental
emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and true science. Whoever does
not know it and can no longer wonder, no longer marvel, is as good as dead, and
his eyes are dimmed.”
28
Knowledge-inquiry, by contrast, all too often fails to nourish “the holy curi-
osity of inquiry”,
29 and may even crush it out altogether. Knowledge-inquiry
gives no rational role to emotion and desire; passionate curiosity, a sense of
mystery, of wonder have, officially, no place within the rational pursuit of
knowledge. The intellectual domain becomes impersonal and split off from
personal feelings and desires; it is difficult for “holy curiosity” to flourish in
such circumstances. Knowledge-inquiry hardly encourages the view that inquiry
at its most fundamental is thinking that goes on as a part of life; on the contrary,
it upholds the idea that fundamental research is highly esoteric, conducted by
physicists in contexts remote from ordinary life. Even though the aim of inquiry
may, officially, be human knowledge, the personal and social dimension of this
is all too easily lost sight of, and progress in knowledge is conceived of in im-
personal terms, stored lifelessly in books and journals. Rare is it for popular
books on science to take seriously the task of exploring the fundamental prob-
lems of a science in as accessible, non-technical, and intellectually responsible a
way as possible. Such work is not highly regarded by knowledge-inquiry, as it
does not contribute to “expert knowledge”. The failure of knowledge-inquiry to
take seriously the highly problematic nature of the aims of inquiry leads to in-
sensitivity as to what aims are being pursued, to a kind of institutional hypoc-
risy. Officially, knowledge is being sought “for its own sake”, but actually the
goal may be immortality, fame, or the flourishing of one’s career or research
group, as the existence of bitter priority disputes in science indicates. Education
suffers. Science students are taught a mass of established scientific knowledge,
but may not be informed of the problems that gave rise to this knowledge, the
problems that scientists grappled with in creating the knowledge. Even more
rarely are students encouraged themselves to grapple with such problems. And
rare, too, is it for students to be encouraged to articulate their own problems of
understanding that must inevitably arise in absorbing all this information, or to
articulate their instinctive criticisms of the received body of knowledge. All this
tends to reduce education to a kind of intellectual indoctrination, and serves to
kill “holy curiosity”. Officially, courses in universities divide up into those that
are vocational, like engineering, medicine, and law, and those that are purely
educational, like physics, philosophy, or history. What is not noticed—again
—————————
28 Ibid., p. 11.
29 A. Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. P. A.
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through insensitivity to problematic aims—is that the supposedly purely educa-
tional are actually vocational as well: the student is being trained to be an aca-
demic physicist, philosopher, or historian, even though only a minute percent-
age of the students will go on to become academics. Real education, which must
be open-ended, and without any pre-determined goal, rarely exists in universi-
ties, and yet no one notices.
(2) In order to enhance our understanding of persons as beings of value, po-
tentially and actually, we need to understand them empathically, by putting our-
selves imaginatively into their shoes, and experiencing, in imagination, what
they feel, think, desire, fear, plan, see, love, and hate. For wisdom-inquiry, this
kind of empathic understanding is rational and intellectually fundamental. Ar-
ticulating problems of living, and proposing and assessing possible solutions is,
we have seen, the fundamental intellectual activity of wisdom-inquiry. But it is
just this that we need to do to acquiring empathic understanding. Social inquiry,
in tackling problems of living, is also promoting empathic understanding of
people. Empathic understanding is essential to wisdom. Elsewhere I have ar-
gued, indeed, that empathic understanding plays an essential role in the evolu-
tion of consciousness. It is required for cooperative action, and even for sci-
ence.
30
Granted knowledge-inquiry, on the other hand, empathic understanding
hardly satisfies basic requirements for being an intellectually legitimate kind of
explanation and understanding. In empathically understanding another person, I
do not have a predictive, testable theory of that other person; my understanding
seems merely intuitive, personal, emotional, subjective, and evaluative, and thus
not a potential contribution to knowledge. Psychology pursued within the con-
text of knowledge-inquiry seeks to develop factual, predictive theories of hu-
man behavior (including theories about the capacity of people to acquire em-
pathic understanding of each other). In conceiving of others and ourselves in
such terms, we are led to construe people as value-neutral, factual entities; even
worse, just as the use of predictive theories of natural science is to enable us to
manipulate natural phenomena, the standard use of predictive psychological
theories is to enable us to manipulate people, for example, in connection with
advertising. In inviting us to see our fellow human beings in such a way, this
kind of knowledge is hardly of intrinsic value.
Wisdom-inquiry enhances our capacity to see and understand what is of
value, potentially and actually, in the lives of others; it helps us to understand
others both from their own point of view, and from a more objective standpoint;
and it helps such things as cooperative action, communication, friendship, and
—————————
30 For my fuller accounts of empathic understanding (or “person-to-person,” or “personalistic”
understanding), and the fundamental role that this kind of understanding has in human life, and in
wisdom-inquiry, see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, pp. 171–189 and chapter 10. See also my
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love to flourish. Knowledge-inquiry, by contrast, encourages us to see people in
purely factual terms, robbed of significance and value, things to be manipulated
as we might manipulate natural phenomena.
(3) Wisdom-inquiry does better justice to the intellectual value of theoretical
physics and cosmology, than does knowledge-inquiry. Wisdom-inquiry resur-
rects natural philosophy—theoretical physics as the philosophical quest to un-
derstand the nature of the universe. Aim-oriented empiricism (the philosophy of
science associated with wisdom-inquiry) does full justice to this aspect of sci-
ence. It holds that, in order to be acceptable, a theory must (a) unify or explain,
and (b) successfully predict phenomena. Standard empiricism (the philosophy
of science associated with knowledge-inquiry), by contrast, cannot do justice to
this aspect of science. It holds that theories are to be assessed on the basis of
empirical success and failure, no permanent assumption being made about the
universe. As a result, standard empiricism cannot do justice to the way science
persistently chooses theories that explain and enable us to understand, for to do
so would be to acknowledge that science does make a persistent assumption
about the universe, namely, that it is comprehensible, which clashes with the
basic tenet of standard empiricism. As a result, “explanation”, within standard
empiricism, tends to mean no more than “prediction of a wide range of phe-
nomena”, which is, of course, a part, but only a part, of what scientific explana-
tion amounts to. The result is that there is always the danger that science itself
will come to neglect the search for understanding, and will settle for the less
demanding goal of merely predicting more and more phenomena more and
more accurately.
31 Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) provides an example.
Granted aim-oriented empiricism, OQT is unacceptable. OQT predicts a wealth
of phenomena, but fails to solve basic problems of understanding, such as what
sort of entity an electron is, and whether quantum phenomena are probabilistic
or deterministic in character. Granted standard empiricism, however, OQT is
eminently acceptable. For decades, the majority of physicists accepted OQT and
thereby abandoned the search for understanding. The cultural value of science
was, as a result, seriously compromised.
32
8. THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION REQUIRED TO CREATE
THE LOVE OF WISDOM
So far I have argued that academic inquiry, as it exists at present, devoted
primarily to the pursuit of knowledge, is grossly and damagingly irrational
when judged from the standpoint of helping us learn how to make progress to-
—————————
31 A major concern of my The Comprehensibility of the Universe is to resurrect natural phi-
losophy, the effort to understand the universe in a way that involves a synthesis of science, phi-
losophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and methodology.
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ward a wise world. If we are to create a wiser world, one major step that we
need to take is to bring about a major revolution in the aims and methods of
academic inquiry, so that it becomes rationally designed to help us acquire wis-
dom.
What are the changes that need to be made to academic inquiry, and how
would making these changes help with the task of creating a better world?
These are the questions I now, briefly, answer. The changes I indicate are not
arbitrary; they all arise from the simple demand that academic inquiry should
put problem-solving and aim-oriented rationality into practice in seeking to help
humanity become wiser.
1. There needs to be a change in the basic intellectual aim of inquiry, from
the growth of knowledge to the growth of wisdom—wisdom being
taken to be the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself
and others, and thus including knowledge, understanding, and techno-
logical know-how.
2. There needs to be a change in the nature of academic problems—so that
problems of living are included, as well as problems of knowledge.
3. There needs to be a change in the nature of academic ideas, so that pro-
posals for action are included as well as claims to knowledge.
4. There needs to be a change in what constitutes intellectual progress, so
that progress-in-ideas-relevant-to-achieving-a-more-civilized-world is
included as well as progress in knowledge.
5. There needs to be a change in the idea as to where inquiry, at its most
fundamental, is located. It is not esoteric theoretical physics, but rather
the thinking we engage in as we seek to achieve what is of value in life.
6. There needs to be a dramatic change in the nature of social inquiry.
Economics, politics, sociology, and so on, are not, fundamentally, sci-
ences, and do not, fundamentally, have the task of improving knowl-
edge about social phenomena. Instead, their task is threefold. First, it is
to articulate problems of living, and propose and critically assess possi-
ble solutions, possible actions or policies, from the standpoint of their
capacity, if implemented, to promote wiser ways of living. Second, it is
to promote such cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living
throughout the social world. And third, at a more basic and long-term
level, it is to help build the hierarchical structure of aims and methods
of aim-oriented rationality into personal, institutional, and global life,
thus creating frameworks within which progressive improvement of
personal and social life aims and methods becomes possible.
7. Natural science needs to change, so that it includes at least three levels
of discussion: evidence, theory, and research aims. Discussion of aims
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erations in an attempt to discover the most desirable and realizable re-
search aims.
8. There needs to be a dramatic change in the relationship between social
inquiry and natural science, so that social inquiry becomes intellectually
more fundamental from the standpoint of tackling problems of living,
promoting wisdom.
9. The way in which academic inquiry as a whole is related to the rest of
the human world needs to change dramatically. Instead of being intel-
lectually dissociated from the rest of society, academic inquiry needs to
be communicating with, learning from, teaching, and arguing with the
rest of society—in such a way as to promote cooperative rationality and
social wisdom. Academia needs to have just sufficient power to retain
its independence from the pressures of government, industry, the mili-
tary, and public opinion, but no more. Academia becomes a kind of civil
service for the public, doing openly and independently what actual civil
services are supposed to do in secret for governments.
10. There needs to be a change in the role that political and religious ideas,
works of art, expressions of feelings, desires, and values have within ra-
tional inquiry. Instead of being excluded, they need to be explicitly in-
cluded and critically assessed, as possible indications and revelations of
what is of value, and as unmasking of fraudulent values in satire and
parody, vital ingredients of wisdom.
11. There need to be changes in education so that, for example, seminars
devoted to the cooperative, imaginative, and critical discussion of prob-
lems of living are at the heart of all education from five-year-olds on-
wards. Politics, which cannot be taught by knowledge-inquiry, becomes
central to wisdom-inquiry, political creeds and actions being subjected
to imaginative and critical scrutiny.
12. There need to be changes in the aims, priorities and character of pure
science and scholarship, so that it is the curiosity, the seeing and search-
ing, the knowing and understanding of individual persons that ulti-
mately matters, the more impersonal, esoteric, purely intellectual as-
pects of science and scholarship being means to this end. Social inquiry
needs to give intellectual priority to helping empathic understanding be-
tween people to flourish.
13. There need to be changes in the way mathematics is understood, pur-
sued, and taught. Mathematics is not a branch of knowledge at all.
Rather, it is concerned to explore problematic possibilities, and to de-
velop, systematize and unify problem-solving methods.
14. Literature needs to be put close to the heart of rational inquiry, in that it
explores imaginatively our most profound problems of living and aids
personalistic understanding in life by enhancing our ability to enter
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15. Philosophy needs to change so that it ceases to be just another special-
ized discipline and becomes instead that aspect of inquiry as a whole
that is concerned with our most general and fundamental problems—
those problems that cut across all disciplinary boundaries. Philosophy
needs to become again what it was for Socrates: the attempt to devote
reason to the growth of wisdom in life.
33
This is the revolution we need to bring about in our traditions and institu-
tions of learning, if we are to create the love of wisdom, and if we are to learn
how to make progress toward a wiser world.
—————————
33 For further discussion of the revolution in academic aims and methods that I am advocating
here, see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, and Is Science Neurotic?.